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DID A SOVIET MERCHANT SHIP ENCOUNTER
THE PEARL HARBOR STRIKE FORCE?
Marty Bollinger
Over the past two decades several authors have advanced the propositionthat a Soviet freighter, traveling from the west coast of North America to
Vladivostok in Russia’s Far East, encountered the Japanese carrier attack force
bearing down on Hawaii in the days before 7 December 1941. There is further
speculation that this merchantman reported its contact to Soviet authorities, or
that the circumstances surrounding its voyage indicate that the Soviets knew of
the impending attack on Pearl Harbor. In any case, such warning was either not
passed on to American authorities or was delivered but not acted upon. There-
fore, it is argued, this incident is further evidence of duplicity in the events sur-
rounding America’s entry into World War II, though views differ as to whether
that charge is most appropriately leveled against the U.S. or Soviet government.
This scenario has become fodder for observers ranging from serious academ-
ics to conspiracy theorists.1 But did it happen? A careful review of the data, in-
cluding detailed shipping records in late 1941 from both Russian and American
sources, suggests this encounter was highly improbable and that much of the
controversy is based on confusion and misunderstanding about the ships in-
volved and the routes they would have taken.
EVOLUTION OF THE CONTACT SCENARIO
Authors have advanced several variations of a scenario involving the intercep-
tion of the Japanese carrier force by a Soviet merchant ship, and the story has
evolved over time, as have the identities of the Soviet ships in question. One of
the earliest accounts, and the only one to describe a specific encounter, was pub-
lished in 1979 in The Reluctant Admiral, a biography of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto
by Hiroyuki Agawa.2 Though Agawa does not suggest that the encounter is part
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of a broader conspiracy and does not even say the ship involved was Soviet, his
book is nonetheless the “patient zero” of this controversy. Agawa describes an
encounter that took place on 6 December, Tokyo time, which was still 5 Decem-
ber in Hawaii:
In fact, on December 6 the [Admiral Chuichi] Nagumo force did catch sight of one
passing vessel of a third nation. Those in command of the task force watched the
progress of the ship in question, a merchantman, with an extraordinary degree of
tension. Had it shown any signs of radioing a report on the movements of the task
force to anyone else, it would probably have found itself at the bottom of the sea
within a few minutes. The vessel, however, must have thought that the Nagumo force
was a fleet engaged in exercises—or possibly it made a correct guess as to its purpose
and was too scared to signal its find—for it soon disappeared from sight without
anything happening.3
If true, this scenario puts the intercept at a location about 950 nautical miles
north of Hawaii in the vicinity of latitude 37° north, 161° west, just two days be-
fore the infamous attack. Unfortunately for those wishing to track down the
original sources, Agawa does not provide a reference for this story or even a biblio-
graphy, and the ship and its nationality remain unspecified.
In 1985 a retired American rear admiral, Edwin T. Layton, citing Agawa’s ver-
sion of an encounter, contributed an additional scenario in his “And I Was
There”: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets.4 Layton labors to ad-
vance several possible explanations for mysterious radio signals detected by a ra-
dio operator aboard Lurline, a Matson liner operating in the Pacific in early
December 1941. It is often reported that these signals, picked up between 1 and 3
December, and in a form not intelligible to Lurline’s radio operator, must have
been from the Japanese strike force.5 These signals, and the circumstances sur-
rounding the subsequent loss of the Lurline’s radio logbook, have long served as
substantiation for conspiracy theorists regarding American foreknowledge of
the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Layton puts forward the hypothesis that the Soviet steamship Uritskii could
have been the source of these radio transmissions.6 He notes that the Japanese
admirals at sea had been warned by their counterparts ashore to be on the look-
out for two Soviet ships operating in the North Pacific and postulates that one of
them had to have been Uritskii, since it left San Francisco on its way to
Vladivostok about the same time as the Japanese fleet left the Kuril Islands for its
attack on Pearl Harbor. Layton also repeats Agawa’s story of an encounter at sea
on 5 December (Hawaii time) and concludes that “the timing and location of
the contact reveal that the vessel sighted by the Kido Butai [special attack force,
i.e., the carrier strike force] could have been only Uritskii.”7
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Independently of any encounter at sea, the voyage of Uritskii also plays a vital
role in Layton’s complex theory that the Soviets knew of the Japanese plans in
advance.8 This theory is based on his observation that the United States never inter-
cepted any warning sent by Japanese spies in San Francisco back to Japan regard-
ing the sailing of Uritskii on a possible converging course with the attack fleet. In
a bit of tortured and incomplete logic, Layton argues this lack of a warning sug-
gests collusion between the Soviets and Japanese and that therefore the Soviets
had to have known of the plans in advance. Layton further suggests that at least
some of this information may have made its way to President Franklin D. Roosevelt
by 26 November, either intercepted by U.S. intelligence or provided by the Soviet
premier, Iosif Stalin, to the United States.
In 1990, Michael Slackman went farther, claiming without reservation that
the ship “of a third nation” encountered on 5 December (Hawaii time) was in
fact Uritskii, citing Agawa and Layton as his sources. Slackman further argues, in
the spirit of Sherlock Holmes, that the absence of a radio transmission from
Uritskii following this encounter raises the possibility of collusion, as put for-
ward by Layton, though it “by no means prove[s] that the Soviets knew of the
Japanese plans.”9
Another author, though he actually refuted the role of Uritskii as a candidate
for an encounter, is relevant because he introduced a new ship into the scenario,
the tanker Azerbaidzhan. Robert D. Stinnett, in Day of Deceit: The Truth about
FDR and Pearl Harbor (published in 2000), reports that the Japanese had been
warned to be on the lookout for two Soviet ships, Layton’s Uritskii as well as the
tanker Azerbaidzhan, but that an actual encounter “didn’t happen.”10 Stinnett
convincingly dismisses Layton’s scenario around Uritskii, noting that the Soviet
ship, shortly after sailing from San Francisco for Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka,
proceeded instead to Astoria, Oregon, and remained there until 5 December.11
Stinnett also reports that Azerbaidzhan, which left the United States around the
same time, was “diverted south,” though without explaining what that means or
presenting compelling evidence that such a diversion ruled out a potential en-
counter at sea with the Japanese.12
This controversy continued in 2001 with the publication of Michael Gannon’s
Pearl Harbor Betrayed: The True Story of a Man and a Nation under Attack.
Building upon Agawa’s original report, published in English in 1979, about an
encounter on 5 December (Hawaii time), Gannon contends that the most likely
candidates for an interception were the Soviet tanker Azerbaidzhan, as suggested
by Stinnett, as well as the freighter Uzbekistan, a newcomer to the controversy.13
He does not mention Uritskii, though he cites Layton as a source. Gannon refers
his readers to Layton’s argument that the failure of the Japanese to sink this Rus-
sian ship indicates the possibility of collusion between the Soviet and Japanese
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governments, but he is very clear that such collusion is only conjecture and “has
never been proved.”
That is where we stand today. Three Soviet ships have been suggested for a po-
tential encounter with the Japanese: Uritskii, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaidzhan. The
date of the encounter ranges from 1 December to 5 December. If the former, the
encounter would have been about 1,750 nautical miles to the northwest of Pearl
Harbor, in the vicinity of 43° north, 178° east. If the latter, the encounter would
have taken place about 950 nautical miles to the north of Pearl Harbor, in
around 37° north, 161° west.
UNRAVELING THE STORY
Hiroyuki Agawa was the first author who published an account wherein the Jap-
anese fleet actually intercepted a merchant ship, and no such account has sur-
faced since. Certainly there has been ample opportunity. In 1993, Donald J.
Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon presented The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the
Japanese Plans, a compilation of firsthand material from those involved in the
planning and execution of the mission.14 This includes an affidavit from Com-
mander Minoru Genda, the chief planner of the attack, and the diaries of Cap-
tain Shigeshi Uchida and Commander Sadamu Sanagi, both of whom served in
the Operations Section of the Naval General Staff in December 1941. The book
also presents entries from the war diaries of the Combined Fleet, the destroyer
Akigumo, the 5th Carrier Division, 1st Destroyer Squadron, and 3rd Battleship
Division. None of these accounts mentions anything about an encounter with a
merchant ship, though the diaries of those involved indicate that great care was
taken to avoid detection and refer to reports from Japanese fleets in other parts
of the Pacific about encounters with Allied or other ships.15
In his Reluctant Admiral, Agawa fails, as we have seen, to provide a source for
his story of the encounter. In correspondence with the present author, Agawa
confirms that he has never come across a written account of this encounter and
that none exists in his personal records or in the official records maintained by
the Military History Division of the Japanese Defense Agency.16 By his own ac-
count, his depiction is based on a comment made to him decades ago by an indi-
vidual in the Military History Division. It is conceivable that this comment arose
from warnings received by the carrier strike force of a Soviet ship sailing along
its route rather than an actual encounter. It could also relate to an encounter be-
tween a Soviet merchant ship and a Japanese warship far from the carrier strike
force.17
It is known that the Japanese were on the lookout for Soviet ships, as was doc-
umented in 1994 in Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy Communications
Intelligence 1924–1941.18 Prepared by Frederick D. Parker, of the Center for
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Cryptological History of the U.S. National Security Agency, this publication
presents intercepts of Japanese wartime naval communications, decoded by the
United States after the war’s end. One transmission, logged as SRN-116667, was
sent on 27 November from the imperial headquarters to the striking force: “Al-
though there are indications of several ships operating in the Aleutian area, the
ships in the Northern Pacific appear chiefly to be Russian ships. . . . They are
Uzbekistan (about 3,000 tons . . . 12 knots) and Azerbaidzhan (6,114 tons[,] less
than 10 knots). Both are westbound from San Francisco.”
Other accounts of this warning indicate that it identified the most likely time
of an encounter as 27–29 November.19 It is clear now that Layton and Slackman,
in advancing the case for Uritskii intercepting the Japanese, and that Stinnett, in
refuting that contention, were in fact chasing a red herring—it was not Uritskii
but Uzbekistan, along with Azerbaidzhan, that the Japanese were worried about.
Layton’s original conspiracy argument, which hinges on the absence of inter-
cepted warnings regarding Uritskii, now falls apart: we now know, as Layton did
not in 1985, that the reason the United States never intercepted such a specific
warning is that none was ever sent.
Certainly the Japanese had reason to be concerned about the possibility of an
encounter with a Soviet merchant fleet. In late 1941, ships moving across the
North Pacific were given considerable attention by the Japanese, since the Impe-
rial Japanese Navy was at the same time assembling its Hawaiian attack force in
Hitokappu Bay on Etorofu (now Iturup) Island in the southern Kuril Islands.
The degree of concern is illustrated in the extent to which the attack plan at-
tended to the threat of accidental discovery by merchant shipping. Vice Admiral
Ryunosuke Kusaka, chief of staff of the First Air Fleet in 1941, described the
planning methodology: “After making an extensive study of all passages of ships
all over the Pacific for the past ten years or more, the course was selected to pass
through the line near 40 degrees North Latitude that any ships had never passed
B O L L I N G E R 9 7
FIGURE 1
Layton, Slackman, and Stinnett mistook Uritskii (left) as the subject of a warning sent to the Japanese fleet. In fact, the warning concerned the Uzbekistan (right).
Author’s personal collection
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before [sic], aiming to reach the point about 800 miles due north of the Hawai-
ian Islands.”20
Alas, the ten years of historical shipping data missed a major change in trad-
ing patterns that began after 22 June 1941: an unprecedented flood of aid from
the United States to the Soviet Union across the Pacific, part of a greatly ex-
panded volume of merchant shipping between the Soviet Union and its trading
partners in the Pacific. After Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June
1941, the Soviets “surged” the ships of their Far East State Sea Shipping Com-
pany for the purpose of obtaining vital materials. Some ships were dispatched to
the South Pacific and Indian oceans to collect emergency supplies of tin, rubber,
and food.21 Others were dispatched to the United States to secure emergency aid.
Even though Washington did not formally extend the Lend-Lease program to
the Soviet Union until 28 October, the Americans agreed on 2 August to provide
the Soviets with emergency supplies, especially of aviation gasoline. The United
States quickly put together an ad hoc fleet of American tankers to this end.22 Si-
multaneously, the first wave of four Soviet ships departed the United States for
Vladivostok with emergency cargoes of fuel;23 a second caravan of ships from the
Soviet Far East merchant fleet left shortly thereafter.24 At the same time, a third
wave of ships headed the opposite way, to the United States.25 It seems the route
between San Francisco and Los Angeles and Vladivostok was crisscrossed with
wakes, far in excess of historical trading patterns.
Japanese agents, already in place in West Coast ports to monitor commercial
as well as naval ship movements, reported the departure of tankers from Los An-
geles to the Soviet Union. Rear Admiral Giichi Nakahara, head of the navy’s Per-
sonnel Bureau, recorded the following in his diary on 22 August: “The U.S. is
carrying on a propaganda actively [sic] that she is supporting Russia by supply-
ing the latter with gasoline. Rumors run that oil tankers are headed for
Vladivostok. But I wonder if it’s true or not. . . . It would be better for us to warn
the U.S. that the American support of Russia is quite troublesome.”26 The ru-
mors were true, which caused concern for Japanese officials. Nakahara further
wrote in his diary on 29 August: “Transportation route of the U.S. to supply Rus-
sia with materials for aid—it should be contrived that the route will not be made
through the Japan Sea.”27
Fortunately for Japan, the frantic burst of activity between the United States
and the Soviet Far East began to slow as summer transitioned into autumn, in
part due to growing tensions with Japan over the matter. After all, Japan was al-
lied with Germany, with whom the Soviet Union was engaged in mortal combat.
Moreover, Japan suffered under an oil embargo by the United States at the very
time the Americans were dispatching tankers, bursting with gasoline, to
Vladivostok, passing within sight of the Japanese home islands. Japan informed
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the Soviet Union in late August that it would object to and potentially prevent
shipments of aid to Russia via Vladivostok.28 Less than a week later it was re-
ported that the United States would shift the destination of Soviet aid from
Vladivostok to points in the Persian Gulf, which would offer a more direct route
to the Soviet war front and had recently opened up as a result of the joint Soviet-
British occupation of Iran.29
By mid-October worsening relations between the United States and Japan
had led to a warning issued by the Navy Department for all U.S.-flagged ships in
Asiatic waters to avoid areas where they might be attacked. These ships were ad-
vised to put into friendly ports to await instructions, suggesting to contempo-
rary observers the likely termination of planned voyages to the USSR by
fourteen American freighters.30 Within a week the United States announced its
plan to terminate all shipments of war materiel to Vladivostok, in favor of routes
across the Atlantic to Arkhangel'sk.31 Contemporary reports refer to rumored
threats by the new Hideki Tojo government in Japan, formed on 15 October. But
the reason could have been more prosaic: it was being said that the docks at
Vladivostok were overwhelmed with aid and that the long thin line of the
Trans-Siberian Railway could not accommodate the accumulating stockpile. As
was reported at the time: “Vladivostok has been temporarily abandoned as a
port of entry for U.S. goods, not only because of the danger of friction with Japan.
Vladivostok, though much farther south, has more ice than Archangel. Besides,
the long Trans-Siberian Railway is far too busy carrying troops to the front and
machinery from it.”32
This planned termination was apparent to Japan in late October. Rear Admi-
ral Nakahara’s diary for 24 October noted, “The United States made it clear that
to transport materials for aiding the USSR through Vladivostok would be
stopped.” His diary for 26 October followed up: “The United States Navy De-
partment made a showdown [sic] that the transportation route of sending mate-
rial for the aid of the Soviet was changed to Boston–Archangel course.”33 By late
October it was being reported in the American press that all U.S.-flagged ships
voyaging to the Soviet Far East had been recalled to friendly ports.34 But what of
the few remaining Soviet ships already planning a voyage back home? How likely
is it that one of these ships might have encountered the Japanese?
SOVIET SHIP MOVEMENTS IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1941
Fifty-five Soviet freighters and tankers operated outside Soviet waters in the Pa-
cific region in 1941.35 One, Vatslav Vorovskii, had been written off as a total loss
after running aground on the Columbia Bar on 3 April. After the German inva-
sion, eight others were sent to the South Pacific or Indian Ocean, and another
fourteen transited from the Pacific to the Atlantic via the Panama Canal.36 None
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of these twenty-three ships is a candidate for an encounter with the Japanese
carriers. Of the remaining thirty-two ships—that is, those operating in the
North Pacific—some were held up in U.S. ports pending emergency repairs after
having been declared unseaworthy by the Coast Guard. Others were unloading
in Vladivostok in late November and early December 1941, and still others at
that time were loading in American ports.
Of the fifty-five ships in total, only four sailed from the United States from
West Coast ports to the Soviet Far East between 7 November and 30 November,
which is the critical interval for a possible Soviet-Japanese encounter at sea. Any
ship departing before 7 November would have in all likelihood been passing
westward through the northern Kuril Islands when the Japanese fleet sailed
eastward, over five hundred nautical miles to the south. Ships departing after 30
November could not have reached the Japanese fleet even had they sailed at high
speed straight for the launch point north of Hawaii.37
The four ships that sailed in this interval were Uritskii, Azerbaidzhan,
Uzbekistan—all mentioned previously—and the timber carrier Clara Zetkin.
Uritskii and Clara Zetkin can be ruled out quite easily. The former left San Fran-
cisco on 28 November heading to Portland, Oregon, on the Columbia River, and
thence to Vladivostok. The latter departed the following day, also with Portland
as its destination. Neither ship proceeded directly to Portland, both stopping in-
stead on 1 December at Astoria, near the mouth of the Columbia. Uritskii re-
mained there until 5 December. Clara Zetkin stayed a day longer, departing
Astoria on 6 December. Neither could have intercepted the Japanese fleet.38
This leaves Uzbekistan and Azerbaidzhan, the two ships put forward as candi-
dates for an encounter by Gannon and the subjects of the original fleet warning
sent by Tokyo in 1941. The former sailed from San Francisco on 12 November,
heading to Vladivostok, and Azerbaidzhan followed two days later for the same des-
tination.39 Based only on the timing and intended destination, it is reasonable to
suppose they might in fact have approached the Japanese fleet in late November—
hence the warning sent to the Japanese task force.
This warning may have been unnecessary. The United States and the USSR
had recently opened up a new route for Lend-Lease ships traveling to
Vladivostok that greatly reduced the probability of an encounter. Up to the mid-
dle of 1941, Soviet ships would have followed a route that took them south of the
Aleutians—and into the teeth of the prevailing westerly winds and along a
rock-strewn and fog-covered coast. The new track led through Unimak Pass in
the Aleutians into the Bering Sea, passing north of the Aleutian chain and
reaching the Soviet Union near Ust'-Kamchatsk. This new route, about the
same distance and somewhat safer, had been developed after a major hydro-
graphic expedition launched in 1939 and continued in 1940;40 up until then it had
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been considered too dangerous, due to the lack of reliable charts. After August
1941 this northerly route became standard for Soviet ships on Lend-Lease mis-
sions and is known to have been in use in November 1941.41 Ice does not seem to
have been an impediment; Russian ships were seen traveling through Unimak
Pass as late in that winter as February.42
While the exact position of these ships at any particular time remains un-
known, it is possible to develop reasonable estimates given the probable courses
steered during the 4,700-nautical-mile trip to Vladivostok, known times of de-
parture, and the ships’ known speeds. For example, we know that Uzbekistan de-
parted San Francisco on 12 November and that its estimated speed was twelve
knots. Map 2 illustrates the probable track and positions of Uzbekistan along the
route, as well as positions of the Japanese carrier strike force.
Given the assumptions reflected in map 2, Uzbekistan would have left San
Francisco on a northerly heading, skirting the Gulf of Alaska until reaching
Unimak Pass, then heading across the Bering Sea and making a landfall off Ust'-
Kamchatsk around 24 November, then proceeding south to Petropavlovsk-
Kamchatka. If Uzbekistan did not stop at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka, it would
have passed through the Sea of Okhotsk and entered the Sea of Japan via the La
Perouse Strait, heading thence to Vladivostok and arriving there around 29 No-
vember (Tokyo time). The Japanese fleet’s closest point of approach would have
been midday on 26 November (Tokyo time), shortly after it sailed from
Hitokappu Bay, when Uzbekistan was about four hundred nautical miles north
in the Sea of Okhotsk, on the other side of the Kuril Islands. As the Japanese fleet
encountered periods of driving snow and dense fog during the first few days at
B O L L I N G E R 1 0 1
MAP 1
MAJOR SHIPPING ROUTES TO VLADIVOSTOK FROM U.S. WEST COAST
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sea, visual contact would have been uncertain even had the ships been much
closer.43
Azerbaidzhan was originally scheduled to depart San Francisco on 10 Novem-
ber, but that sailing was canceled, and it did not actually get under way until 14
November.44 It would have followed the same route as Uzbekistan. Somewhat
1 0 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
MAP 2
PROBABLE POSITIONS OF UZBEKISTAN AND JAPANESE STRIKE FORCE
MAP 3
PROBABLE POSITIONS OF AZERBAIDZHAN AND JAPANESE STRIKE FORCE
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slower than Uzbekistan, it would have still been in the Bering Sea north of the
Aleutians when the Japanese fleet departed for Hawaii, and the nearest point of
approach would have occurred on 28 or 29 November (Tokyo time), on which
dates Azerbaidzhan was about a thousand miles to the north. There is, however,
one element of uncertainty surrounding Azerbaidzhan. The San Francisco Mari-
time Exchange log card for Azerbaidzhan recording the ship’s departure from
San Francisco at 10 AM adds the parenthetical comment “diverted south.” It is
unclear exactly what this means, and no precise records of this ship’s movements
in late 1941 have surfaced.45 It is possible that the turn to the south was a func-
tion of the weather, for two days later, shortly after Uzbekistan sailed on 12 No-
vember, a major gale hit the Pacific Northwest, wreaking havoc with local
shipping.46 Perhaps Azerbaidzhan was aware of the approach of the storm and
deviated slightly to the south to avoid it before heading toward the Alaskan
coast, thence resuming the normal route to the Soviet Union.47
But what if Azerbaidzhan did not follow the new northerly route to
Vladivostok at all? What if the reference to “diverted south” indicates that the
ship took the more traditional southerly route to Vladivostok? Or, what if its
captain decided to take the shortest great-circle route home after maneuvering
around the storm, then slashing the Pacific Northwest? In the former case,
Azerbaidzhan would have reached the Aleutian Islands on 26 November, just
about the time the Japanese fleet sailed from Hitokappu Bay. The closest point of
B O L L I N G E R 1 0 3
FIGURE 2
The Japanese strike force was also warned to be on the lookout for the Soviet tanker Azerbaidzhan.
Author’s personal collection
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approach would have been around 28 November, when Azerbaidzhan would
have been about five hundred nautical miles north of the Japanese fleet and
heading in the opposite direction.
Similarly, if Uzbekistan after avoiding the storm took a great-circle route,
thereby passing well south of the Aleutian Islands, it still would have passed into
the Sea of Okhotsk before the Japanese strike force sailed from the Kuril Islands
and thus not have been in a position to encounter it. Moreover, even had such a
meeting taken place near the Kuril Islands, it would have occurred within a few
hundred miles of Japanese territory, reducing the significance of any sighting of a
large Japanese fleet. After all, sighting a large number of Japanese warships exer-
cising near home waters would have been less notable than finding that same fleet
thousands of miles from home, near America’s largest naval base in the Pacific.
There is, then, no evidence to support the view affirmed by Gannon and
Slackman, and suggested by Layton, that the Japanese strike force heading for
Hawaii encountered a Soviet merchant ship on 5 December 1941 (Hawaii time).
On that day Uritskii and Clara Zetkin were in Astoria, Uzbekistan was most likely
in Vladivostok or Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka, and Azerbaidzhan was entering
the Sea of Okhotsk over a thousand miles from the Japanese fleet and moving in
the opposite direction. Likewise, no evidence places a Soviet merchant ship in
the vicinity of the Japanese fleet in the period 1–3 December, another scenario
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considered by Layton. The related hypothesis—that the failure to report such an
encounter by the Soviets indicates that the Soviets knew of the impending attack
in advance—can also be rejected based on the available data, inasmuch as it es-
tablishes that there was no encounter.
It is harder to refute out of hand the hypothesis that the Japanese force might
have stumbled upon a Soviet ship much earlier in its journey, around 27 or 28
November. Surely the Japanese had been warned of this potential, and of
Uzbekistan and Azerbaidzhan specifically. Interestingly, this is not the scenario
advanced by Agawa, Layton, Slackman, or Gannon, all of whom place the en-
counter between three and eight days later. The evidence, however, suggests that
neither ship was a candidate for such an encounter even during this earlier pe-
riod, as their courses took them far from the Japanese fleet, with the closest point
of approach hundreds of miles away, in fog and rain, and within or close to Japa-
nese home waters. Therefore, it seems probable the Japanese did manage to
maintain operational security during the tense voyage to Hawaii.
What became of the Soviet ships that played roles in this mystery? Uritskii left
the Pacific in summer 1942 and became a world traveler, transiting the hazard-
ous Northern Sea Route across the roof of the Soviet Union from Vladivostok to
Arkhangel'sk, returning the following year to Vladivostok via the Panama Canal,
thereafter continuing in operation in the Far East until removed from service
in 1957. Azerbaidzhan eventually made its way to New York, where it joined the
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Atlantic convoys on the infamous Kola Run. It was hit by an air-launched tor-
pedo in convoy PQ-17 but managed to carry on, one of the few survivors of that
ill-fated convoy. After the war it returned to civilian service in the Far East until
it was removed from the shipping roster in 1975. Clara Zetkin operated for an-
other three decades in the Pacific, ending its years in the Soviet fishing fleet until
it was broken up in 1975.
Uzbekistan’s career was not as long. The ship operated between the American
West Coast and Russian Far East only until 1 April 1943, when it ran aground off
Vancouver Island. Parts of the wreckage are still visible today, a sad and quiet re-
minder of a global conflict many decades ago—and of the intriguing questions
that continue to arise even sixty-six years afterward.
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FIGURE 3
Uzbekistan, the ship most likely to have encountered the Japanese, was lost on 1 April 1943 after running aground in Darling Creek,
Vancouver Island.
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